1919-2019: How to Make Peace Last?
European Strategy and the Future of the World Order. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 102, January 2019 by Biscop, Sven
1919-2019: How to Make Peace Last?  
European Strategy and the Future of  the World Order  
Sven Biscop 
 
The commemorations of the Great War 
have come to and end. 2019 will see the 
centenary of the peace treaties that 
concluded the war, starting with 
Versailles, and of the founding of the 
League of Nations, the predecessor of 
the United Nations. These failed to 
establish a stable rules-based world 
order, but they deserve to be 
commemorated nonetheless, as well as 
analysed, for we might learn something 
from them. This policy brief offers four 
insights from the Interbellum to help us 
avoid a collapse of the world order today: 
(1) A world order that is created for the 
express purpose of keeping one of the 
great powers outside the system, is 
bound to fail. (2) If breaking the rules 
carries no consequences, the world order 
will be hollowed out and, eventually, 
collapse. (3) A great power who refuses 
to invest in the world order, cannot 
expect the others to do so. (4) No state 
voluntarily submits to another: a world 
order that is only imposed and not 
accepted, will not last long. 
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Like the Interbellum, this is an age of a 
shifting balance of power between a set of 
great powers. None of them is sufficiently 
powerful to impose its view on the world 
order on the others. Hence all the great 
powers are jostling for power. They do still 
cooperate, but they are competing with each 
other at the same time, for leadership, 
influence, and prestige. World War One had 
been triggered by the European great powers, 
but the power game in the interwar years was 
between global powers. The United Kingdom 
and France, both seemingly at the height of 
empire, a resurgent Germany, a powerful but 
hesitant United States, the new Soviet Union, 
and an expansionist Japan were looking for a 
new balance of power. Today it is the 
interaction between the US, China, Russia, 
and – if that is what we want – the European 
Union that will determine the future of the 
world order.  
 
What can we learn from the failure of 
Versailles and the League, in the hope of 
doing better today?  
 
INSIGHTS FROM THE INTERBELLUM  
A first insight is that a world order that is created for 
the express purpose of keeping one of the great powers 
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 outside the system, is bound to fail. Only an 
inclusive world order can be stable: an order 
that all of the great powers feel committed to, 
because they have more interest in its survival 
than in its collapse. If one of the great powers 
is pushed out by the others, that power will 
inevitable contest the world order, and attempt 
to undermine it.  
 
After World War One, there was an 
understandable urge to take revenge on 
Germany, particularly in France. But after a 
while even Paris realised that this revanchism 
was counterproductive and that Europe would 
only be stable again if Germany were allowed 
to re-enter the club of European nations as a 
“normal” state. For the same reason, the other 
states gradually overcame their revulsion of the 
Bolshevik regime and forged relations with the 
Soviet Union. Today, the world order cannot 
be stable unless it includes China. It simply is 
too big and too powerful to keep out.  
 
That does not mean that China has to be kept 
on board at any price. A second historical insight is 
that if breaking the rules carries no consequences, the 
world order will be hollowed out and, eventually, 
collapse. The strongest sanction that the League 
of Nation could impose, was expulsion. But if 
the offender in question did not care, or even 
resigned from the League itself, like Japan 
after its conquest of Manchuria, the League 
was powerless. Allowing China its rightful 
place in the world order does not amount to 
sheepishly accepting each and every Chinese 
policy therefore. One cannot possibly 
recognize China’s sovereignty claims over the 
South China Sea, for example, for that would 
be the end of international maritime law. 
Beijing must be made to see that the world 
order constitutes a single whole: it cannot just 
pick and choose those rules that happen to 
suit its interests. Far-reaching violations of the 
rules will have to have political and economic 
consequences.  
 
This is a difficult balancing act. The EU and 
the US can take each other’s biggest 
corporations to court and impose heavy fines, 
without that having an impact on the 
fundamentals of their relationship. Even the 
EU and Russia continue to trade in spite of the 
Ukraine crisis. In a similar vein, China must 
understand that a rejection of its policy in one 
area does not necessarily mean that we 
designate it as our enemy. Such 
“compartmentalisation”, the capacity to have a 
dispute in one domain and continue to 
cooperate in another, is part and parcel of 
great power relations. It is an important way of 
preventing escalation.  
 
If one wants China to abide by the rules, one 
must follow them oneself. That is a third 
historical insight: a great power who refuses to invest in 
the world order, cannot expect the others to do so. US 
President Woodrow Wilson included the 
creation of the League of Nations in his 
Fourteen Points, which he considered the basis 
of the post-war order. But after the war, an 
isolationist US Senate refused to ratify 
America’s accession. From the start, the 
League was greatly handicapped by this 
American refusal to join.  
 
The rules and the multilateral institutions of 
the current world order were largely American 
creations too, at the end of World War Two. 
But for the first time the US are disinvesting in 
the system, even though it very much is their 
own Pax Americana, because of the perception 
that it benefits other powers more than the US 
itself. How differently did the UK react when 
towards the end of the 19th century Germany 
and the US overtook it as an industrial power. 
Thanks to its early industrialisation, colonial 
expansion, and the power of the Royal Navy, 
which patrolled the seas, Britain had become 
the primus inter pares of the great powers. But 
even when this Pax Britannica began to 
facilitate the expansion of other powers, 
Britain continued to invest in it, because that 
was still much more in its interest than 
abandoning the world order. Today the US has 
reached a different conclusion. The 
consequence is that it is becoming increasingly 
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 difficult to convince the other powers to 
follow the rules. How can the EU berate 
China for not faithfully implementing WTO 
rules when the US itself is blocking that 
organisation?  
 
A final historical insight is that no state voluntarily 
submits to another: a world order that is only imposed 
and not accepted, will not last long. Japan aimed to 
incorporate other countries in its Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but failed because 
it was based on conquest and repression rather 
than on real cooperation. If certain Asian 
actors initially saw some merit in the project, 
that had a lot to do with the absence of any 
alternative as long as the western colonial 
powers had nothing more to offer than empty 
reforms and vague promises about 
independence in the distant future.  
 
Today, Russia once again instils fear in many 
quarters, because of its brutal power politics 
and the invasion of Ukraine, but it has also 
antagonised many. Even states leaning closely 
towards Russia are not so enamoured of 
Moscow that they would volunteer to 
surrender a province. China in a much more 
clever manner uses its economic power to gain 
influence, through its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI). Nevertheless, most countries do not 
want to be sucked completely into China’s 
orbit, because they have seen what little 
sovereignty remains when a country such as 
Sri Lanka becomes totally beholden to Beijing. 
Not everything that China touches turns into 
gold: countries such as Malaysia have already 
withdrawn from the BRI. And this is not the 
Cold War: a country that does participate in 
the BRI does not disappear behind an iron 
curtain. Most countries that are being targeted 
by China and/or Russia prefer to maintain 
good relations with the EU and the US at the 
same time. But Brussels and Washington have 
to put an attractive offer on the table, or 
Beijing and Moscow will end up dominating 
such countries nonetheless.  
 
BISMARCK AND THE EU  
In view of these historical insights, what is the 
right grand strategy for the EU? We can look 
back a bit further into history and draw some 
inspiration from Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck. Not the Bismarck who consciously 
provoked a series of wars in order to unify 
Germany – we have the EU already, so we can 
skip that stage. But the Bismarck who, once he 
had founded the German Empire, constructed 
a web of alliances with Germany in the centre. 
His goal: to have better relations with each of 
the great powers than any of the others had 
with each other, and to prevent the emergence 
of any anti-German coalition among them. A 
goal that as long as Bismarck was in charge he 
achieved very well indeed.  
 
This is exactly the strategy for the EU. In this 
age of great power rivalry, Europe should not 
choose sides. The EU should be the great 
power that maintains good relations with all of 
the other great powers. If the EU manages to 
play this crucial stabilising role, we can prevent 
getting stuck in another bipolar system: the EU 
and the US against China and Russia. Such 
bipolarity would only lead to a logic of 
confrontation without end. That is why the EU 
must continue to invest in the alliance with the 
US (especially now, when things are difficult), 
but seek partnership with China and Russia at 
the same time, in all areas in which interests 
coincide. Such a strategy of engagement aims 
to see all of the great powers enjoy the benefits 
of a rules-based world order, so that they 
would continue to invest in it – and would 
assume their rightful place in that order.  
 
In parallel, the EU must engage strategically 
with other key states, especially those states 
who because of their geographic and economic 
position are important for Europe’s 
“connectivity” with the rest of the world. The 
EU has no use for a sphere of influence, but it 
must prevent the other great powers from 
exclusively dominating other states against 
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 their will, and from closing them off from 
interaction with us. The EU’s objective 
therefore must be sovereignty: ensuring, by 
offering them an appealing package of 
relations with us, that other states continue to 
see an advantage in a genuinely open 
economy, based on global rules that apply to 
all. Instead of having Beijing or Moscow 
decide for them, the EU must motivate other 
states to continue to make their own decisions 
and to freely maintain relations with all of the 
great powers.  
 
AUTONOMOUS STRATEGIC THINKING  
Were the EU to adopt such a strategy, then it 
must abandon two basic tenets of European 
strategic thinking until now.  
 
The first is the idea that what is good for the 
US is good for Europe and, by extension, that 
when push comes to shove the US will always 
come and solve Europe’s problems. The EU 
should of course not adopt a strategy against 
the US, but it must set an autonomous course. 
Otherwise Europeans risk to simply copy the 
American view of the world, by sheer force of 
habit. The consensus in the American strategic 
community, across party lines, however is that 
China is an adversary and perhaps even an 
enemy – the enemy. But is that really true? 
China has become rich and powerful within 
the existing world order; for now at least it 
seems to have very little interest in overturning 
it, therefore. Designating China as a revisionist 
power could easily become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. If the US were to consciously opt 
for a confrontational course towards China, it 
will undoubtedly try to put pressure on 
Europe to follow suit and to reorient the 
Transatlantic alliance in that sense. But ours is 
a defensive alliance, and the Europeans should 
not follow any American attempt to turn it 
into a vehicle for US-China competition.  
 
Of course, the US is a democracy and will 
remain Europe’s closest ally. But the second 
idea that the EU must abandon is that it can 
only have deep partnerships with democracies; 
that the objective of its foreign policy is indeed 
to democratise everybody else. If and when it 
happens, democratisation always is in Europe’s 
interest, because well-functioning democracies 
create stability. But the EU does not have the 
leverage to democratise another great power, 
whereas if it makes democratisation a 
precondition of cooperation with other 
countries, it will exactly push them in the 
direction of China and Russia, at the expense 
of their sovereignty.  
 
All too often, however, the EU falls for the 
temptation to picture world politics as a 
confrontation between the democracies and 
the non-democracies. But that is a distortion: 
world politics today is not about an ideological 
battle, but about the pursuit of interests. Each 
of the great powers has a strategy to safeguard 
its interests, which can of course have a 
negative impact on the interests of the other 
great powers – but that is not the same as 
having a strategy aimed directly against those 
other powers. China has a strategy for China, 
not against Europe. If we willingly make this 
into an ideological battle, once again, we will 
create a new long-term bipolar confrontation. 
The EU’s aim is not to topple President Putin 
or President Xi or their regime. Our aim is that 
Russia and China, and the US, would more or 
less abide by the rules of the world order in 
their relations with other states. Which political 
system each country chooses for itself, is that 
state’s own business, and that of its citizens.  
 
Abandoning democratisation as an objective of 
foreign policy is not the same as abandoning 
human rights. Human rights are universal – 
otherwise they would not be human, but 
western or European or Belgian rights. The 
EU can and must continue a critical human 
rights dialogue with each and every country, 
even though its interests oblige it to cooperate 
with states that do not respect human rights. 
That is inevitable, but the red line must be that 
by cooperating with states that violate human 
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rights, the EU can never become party to 
those violations itself. Short of that, the EU 
can cooperate with every state; the only 
exception could be regimes that are guilty of 
the crimes that give rise to the Responsibility 
to Protect under the UN: war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and ethnic 
cleansing. Finally, the EU must of course 
defend its own democracy, both against 
internal anti-democratic forces and against 
foreign subversion.  
 
CONCLUSION: NOT AN ADMISSION OF 
WEAKNESS  
Playing this stabilising role in a way comes 
natural to the EU, but it should certainly not 
be seen as an admission of weakness. The EU 
can only play this role from a position of 
strength. In the first place, that means political 
strength and unity. If today the EU, divided as 
it currently is, would signal to China that it is 
willing to accommodate it into the world 
order, Beijing will respond: well of course – 
you do not have any other options anyway. 
But a strong and united EU, that sticks to a 
single strategy towards China and the other 
powers, can live up to this crucial stabilising 
role. A great power does not have to engage in 
brutal power politics to safeguard its interests.  
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